Assuring Real Freedom of Movement in EU Direct Taxation

The decisions of the European Court of Justice in applying the Treaty principles of freedom of movement to the direct taxation of individuals have been strongly criticised as taking an overly simplistic view of the interactions between national tax systems. The interactions often make non‐discrimination an inappropriate criterion. This article proposes a framework, grounded in economic analysis, for understanding the implications of the interactions for freedom of movement. First, I establish a precise definition of obstacles to freedom of movement of individuals as costs of migration, as distinguished from incentives to migration (such as mere differences in national tax levels). Incentives can encourage economic distortions in migration, but they are not obstacles to migration (or free movement). Secondly, I develop the cross‐migration test to distinguish costs of migration from incentives. I apply the test to show that two commonly used schemes of double tax relief, including exemption with progression, create unjustified obstacles to free movement.