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Mind the Gap: Law and New Approaches to Governance in the European Union
Author(s) -
Scott Joanne,
Trubek David M.
Publication year - 2002
Publication title -
european law journal
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.351
H-Index - 54
eISSN - 1468-0386
pISSN - 1351-5993
DOI - 10.1111/1468-0386.00139
Subject(s) - law , corporate governance , european union , political science , sociology , library science , management , computer science , economics , economic policy
This issue of the European Law Journal deals with the emergence of a series of new approaches to governance in the European Union. These issues were discussed at a workshop on "Law and New Approaches to Governance in Europe" which we organised. The workshop was held in Madison, Wisconsin in May 2001 and was co- sponsored by the European Union Center of the University of Wisconsin-Madison and the ELJ. Seven of the participants in that workshop developed papers that deal with one or more dimension of the new governance phenomenon. In this essay, we seek to define the concept of new governance, suggest reasons for its emergence, assess the reaction of the European Court and Commission to these developments, and identify some of the conceptual issues this phenomenon presents for legal and political theory. (1) What mechanisms should be considered "new governance" a) A base line for comparison--the "classic" Community Method In order to understand new governance, we must have a baseline from which to depart. For our purposes, we will define new governance as any major departure from the classic 'Community Method' (CCM). The notion of the Community Method is highlighted by the Commission in its recent White Paper on Governance.1 It is, the Commission tells us, premised upon the Commission's exclusive right of legislative initiative, and the legislative (and budgetary) powers of the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. Qualified majority voting is identified by the Commission as an essential element in ensuring the effectiveness of this method, and the European Court as central in guaranteeing respect for the rule of law. On this basis Article 251 EC laying down the co-decision procedure might be seen as constituting an embodiment of the CCM. Alongside the issue of the identity of institutional players, and that of voting procedures in Council, additional features might be cited as closely associated with the CCM. Notable in this respect is the tendency for the CCM to give rise to binding legislative and executive acts at the EU level, and for these to impose more or less uniform rules for all Member States.2 It is ironic, in the light of this latter point, that the Commission should assert so unequivocally the capacity of the Community Method to promote diversity, as well as effectiveness, in the European