Simulation, Co‐cognition, and the Attribution of Emotional States

In the past fifteen years, many philosophers and psychologists have discussed the question of how the human capacity to attribute mental states to other human beings is best explained. On one account – the theory view – it depends primarily on our possession of a body of knowledge about relationships between the environment, mediating mental states, and behaviour. An alternative view – the simulation view – is that possession of a theory does not play this primary role in explaining our capacity for attributing mental states to other people. On this view, the capacity in question depends on our having an ability to simulate other people’s mental processes. Furthermore, our capacity to simulate other people’s mental processes is not itself to be explained as being the result of our possession of a body of theoretical knowledge. At first sight, this might appear to be a relatively arcane debate, primarily of interest to specialists in a fairly narrow area of naturalistically inspired philosophy of mind, and philosophy of cognitive science. In fact, though, its ramifications run deep. What is at issue is the question of whether our everyday understanding of other human beings is based on the same sorts of mechanisms which we bring to bear in our understanding of the natural world or whether it is sui generis. It is likely that the answer to this question will have implications for a range of other philosophical issues, such as the epistemology of other minds, the metaphysics of persons and mental states, and the scientific status of the social sciences. The debate between advocates of the theory and simulation views has mostly focussed on the question of what is involved in attributing beliefs to other people. Other kinds of mental states, including emotions, have received less attention. This is both surprising and significant. It is often thought that, if true, the simulationist view must have a certain degree of generality. Without such generality it could not have the wide ranging consequences it is sometimes claimed for it. But a simulationist account which is only an account of belief attribution does not have such generality. Our beliefs do not constitute the sum or even, necessarily the most important part of our mental lives. Nor is our capacity to attribute beliefs necessarily the most significant or striking aspect of our ability to enter into the minds of others.