Particularism, Generalism and the Counting Argument

In a recent collection of papers – Moral Particularism (hereafter MP ) 1 – some writers argue against a particularist explanation of thick ethical features, particularist in the sense developed by Jonathan Dancy. In this piece I argue that particularists can tackle what I regard as the most interesting argument put forward by these writers, an argument I call the Counting Argument. My aim is twofold. First, I wish to make clear exactly what the debate between particularists and their opponents about the thick rests on. Secondly, I do not wish to provide a ‘knock‐down’ argument to show particularism as true, but merely to push the onus back onto particularism's opponents and show that far more needs to be said. One last introductory comment. After some necessary scene‐setting in the first section, where I explain how the philosophical ground is carved up and introduce some terminology, I indicate why this debate is fundamental in ethical theory although I don’t pursue the idea here.