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Rorty and Moral Relativism
Author(s) -
Miller Christian B.
Publication year - 2002
Publication title -
european journal of philosophy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.42
H-Index - 36
eISSN - 1468-0378
pISSN - 0966-8373
DOI - 10.1111/1468-0378.00166
Subject(s) - miller , citation , relativism , philosophy , epistemology , library science , computer science , biology , ecology
Critics of Rorty’s views on truth, objectivity, and value often take them to imply some form of untenable relativism.1 While it would be worthwhile to investigate whether Rorty is in fact committed to what might be called global relativism, or relativism in most if not all domains of investigation, for our purposes in this paper we must proceed more selectively. By focusing on Rorty’s view of moral objectivity, we can hopefully shed some new light on the now stale charge of Rortian relativism. In the process, we can also go quite a long way towards articulating what a Rortian approach to meta-ethics might look like.