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Voluntary Environmental Agreements: Taking Up Positions And Meeting Pressure
Author(s) -
Grepperud Sverre,
Pedersen Pål Andreas
Publication year - 2003
Publication title -
economics and politics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.822
H-Index - 45
eISSN - 1468-0343
pISSN - 0954-1985
DOI - 10.1111/1468-0343.00126
Subject(s) - negotiation , nothing , business , turnover , government (linguistics) , law and economics , bargaining problem , public relations , industrial organization , economics , law , political science , microeconomics , management , philosophy , linguistics , epistemology
This paper portrays voluntary agreements as a Nash‐bargaining game between the authorities and the polluting industry. Before bargaining starts, the authorities threaten to introduce emission licences if the negotiations come to nothing, while industry, by the use of lobbying campaigns, can make it politically costly to regulate by law. The most likely game of the ones considered is characterized by the authorities first announcing a level of licensing, whereupon industry will adjust its lobbying activity. This game results in a relatively defensive industry and authorities than other games under consideration.