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Campaign Contributions with Swing Voters
Author(s) -
Dix Manfred,
Santore Rudy
Publication year - 2003
Publication title -
economics and politics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.822
H-Index - 45
eISSN - 1468-0343
pISSN - 0954-1985
DOI - 10.1111/1468-0343.00125
Subject(s) - swing , strategist , ideology , perception , political science , social psychology , psychology , economics , law , management , engineering , politics , neuroscience , mechanical engineering
We analyze contributor behavior when there are two types of voters: positioned voters, who care about the ideological positions of candidates, and swing voters, who care about only the leadership abilities of candidates. Campaign expenditures, which are funded by contributions, are assumed to influence voters' perceptions of a candidate's ability. We find that the number of swing voters may have unexpected consequences on equilibrium campaign contributions. In particular, total contributions may increase as the number of swing voters decreases. Elections are won by doing two things: mobilizing your base and winning the independent swing voters. (Karl Rove, campaign strategist for George W. Bush)