Premium
A Test of Political Control of the Bureaucracy: The Case of Mergers
Author(s) -
Coate Malcolm B.
Publication year - 2002
Publication title -
economics and politics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.822
H-Index - 45
eISSN - 1468-0343
pISSN - 0954-1985
DOI - 10.1111/1468-0343.00097
Subject(s) - bureaucracy , presidency , presidential system , public administration , politics , control (management) , scope (computer science) , commission , test (biology) , political science , administration (probate law) , legislature , economics , law , management , computer science , paleontology , biology , programming language
This paper tests a model of political control of the bureaucracy using a data set of mergers evaluated by the Federal Trade Commission between 1983 and 2000. The results support a sophisticated control model in which the President sets the agenda within the scope of policies acceptable to Congress. Changes in Presidential administration and in the composition of Congress can, but do not necessarily, affect merger policy. Instead, the shift in policy depends on how the institutions of the Presidency and Congress interact both in the previous and current periods.