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Electoral Rules, Political Systems, and Institutional Quality
Author(s) -
Valérie Ugo
Publication year - 2001
Publication title -
economics and politics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.822
H-Index - 45
eISSN - 1468-0343
pISSN - 0954-1985
DOI - 10.1111/1468-0343.00095
Subject(s) - incentive , politics , quality (philosophy) , index (typography) , political science , public economics , political system , institutional change , economics , political economy , law and economics , public administration , microeconomics , law , computer science , epistemology , democracy , philosophy , world wide web
This paper explores the links between political rules and institutional quality. The paper concentrates on two political measures: the presence of checks and balances in the political system and an index of political particularism that measures the incentives for politicians to build personal support bases. The paper finds a positive correlation between checks and balances and institutional quality. It also finds that intermediate levels of particularism are associated with higher institutional quality.