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Political Determinants of Intergovernmental Grants: Evidence From Argentina
Author(s) -
Porto Alberto,
Sanguinetti Pablo
Publication year - 2001
Publication title -
economics and politics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.822
H-Index - 45
eISSN - 1468-0343
pISSN - 0954-1985
DOI - 10.1111/1468-0343.00092
Subject(s) - politics , per capita , distribution (mathematics) , representation (politics) , normative , government (linguistics) , political science , order (exchange) , econometric analysis , federalism , public administration , public economics , economics , econometrics , sociology , law , demography , finance , mathematical analysis , population , linguistics , philosophy , mathematics
This paper explores the determinants of federal grants allocation across provincial states in Argentina. Our analysis suggests that the redistributive pattern implicit in the federal system of intergovernmental grants cannot be explained on normative grounds exclusively. In order to understand the rationale behind federal grants distribution, a positive approach could render better results. Specifically, we claim that the distribution of federal grants could be associated with political variables such as the political representation of jurisdictions at Congress. The econometric analysis suggests that the significant disparity observed in the per capita representation across different provinces is an important factor explaining the allocation of those transfers. In this respect, overrepresented provinces, both at the senate and at the lower chamber, have received, on average, higher resources from the national government compared to more populous and less represented states. These results are consistent with those observed in other countries.