Premium
Why Do Policy Makers Give (Permanent) Power to Policy Advisers?
Author(s) -
Swank Otto H.,
Dur Robert A. J.
Publication year - 2001
Publication title -
economics and politics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.822
H-Index - 45
eISSN - 1468-0343
pISSN - 0954-1985
DOI - 10.1111/1468-0343.00084
Subject(s) - unit (ring theory) , power (physics) , public economics , policy analysis , economics , business , public administration , political science , psychology , physics , mathematics education , quantum mechanics
Using a simple game‐theoretical model, this paper analyzes the role of policy advisers in the policy‐making process. We show that policy makers are inclined to appoint advisers whose preferences coincide with their own preferences. Furthermore, we show that policy makers are biased towards erecting permanent advisory units. This result stems from the policy makers' desire to affect the actions of their successors. A permanent advisory unit induces future policy makers to act in accordance with the preferences of current policy makers. The policy‐makers' bias towards erecting permanent advisory units may drive a wedge between actual policy outcomes and socially desired policy outcomes.