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A Game‐Theoretic Model Of The CouP D'État
Author(s) -
Sutter Daniel
Publication year - 2000
Publication title -
economics and politics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.822
H-Index - 45
eISSN - 1468-0343
pISSN - 0954-1985
DOI - 10.1111/1468-0343.00075
Subject(s) - comparative statics , vulnerability (computing) , politics , government (linguistics) , mathematical economics , join (topology) , political science , economics , microeconomics , computer science , mathematics , law , computer security , combinatorics , linguistics , philosophy
I explore the comparative vulnerability of regimes to a coup d'état using a game‐theoretic model. Analysis centers on leaders of groups capable of intervening at the time of a coup. I prove the existence of an equilibrium in which a coup is attempted without restrictions on current government policy, the breadth of participation in politics, or the relative size of the conspiracy. Comparative statics results concerning the willingness of plotters to stage a coup and other leaders to join a coup once under way are established. Differences in comparative regime vulnerability stem from differences in the amount of organization required to attempt a coup.