Premium
Campaign Contributions and the Desirability of Full Disclosure Laws
Author(s) -
Sloof Randolph
Publication year - 1999
Publication title -
economics and politics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.822
H-Index - 45
eISSN - 1468-0343
pISSN - 0954-1985
DOI - 10.1111/1468-0343.00054
Subject(s) - perspective (graphical) , politics , observable , economics , signaling game , law and economics , political science , microeconomics , law , computer science , physics , quantum mechanics , artificial intelligence
In a signaling game model of costly political campaigning in which a candidate is dependent on a donor for campaign funds it is verified whether the electorate may benefit from campaign contributions being directly observed. By purely focusing on the informational role of campaign contributions the model seems somewhat biased against the potential benefits of direct observation. Still, the conclusion can be drawn that directly observable contributions allow for more information being revealed in equilibrium. Using this result, from an informational perspective a case can be built for the desirability of full disclosure laws.