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Local Government Spending and At‐Large Versus District Representation; Do Wards Result in More “Pork”?
Author(s) -
Southwick, Jr L.
Publication year - 1997
Publication title -
economics and politics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.822
H-Index - 45
eISSN - 1468-0343
pISSN - 0954-1985
DOI - 10.1111/1468-0343.00027
Subject(s) - representation (politics) , argument (complex analysis) , ethnic group , exploit , power (physics) , government (linguistics) , state (computer science) , debt , preference , government spending , demographic economics , public economics , political science , economics , welfare , finance , microeconomics , medicine , law , politics , linguistics , philosophy , physics , computer security , algorithm , quantum mechanics , computer science
The issue of at‐large versus ward representation has recently again become controversial. Wards are argued to better represent minorities, both ethnic and preference. However, an opposing argument is that wards encourage spending. It is suggested that one reason for this is that, with ward representation, a coalition can be put together to exploit other areas of the city. This question is tested empirically and it is found that spending, debt, and taxes are both significantly and substantially higher in cities where ward representatives have greater power than in cities where at‐large representatives have the greater power. It is conjectured that this same effect results in higher state and federal expenditures than would be desired by the majority of voters.