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Transboundary Fishery: A Differential Game Model
Author(s) -
Benchekroun Hassan,
Van Long Ngo
Publication year - 2002
Publication title -
economica
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.532
H-Index - 65
eISSN - 1468-0335
pISSN - 0013-0427
DOI - 10.1111/1468-0335.00279
Subject(s) - commit , differential game , first mover advantage , fishing , differential (mechanical device) , mathematical economics , interval (graph theory) , repeated game , economics , aggregate (composite) , fishery , microeconomics , game theory , mathematics , computer science , mathematical optimization , physics , biology , thermodynamics , industrial organization , combinatorics , materials science , database , composite material
We consider a differential game between two players, where one player has the first–mover advantage. We compare the equilibrium of this model with the one generated by a conventional symmetric model. The existence of a first mover results in more conservationist exploitation in the aggregate. We also consider the implication of departures from the equilibrium. If the leader can commit to decrease its fishing effort over a finite interval of time, then the follower may respond by increasing, or decreasing, its catch rate, depending on the length of the commitment period.