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Reach for the Stars: A Strategic Bidding Game
Author(s) -
Pepall Lynne M.,
Richards Daniel J.
Publication year - 2001
Publication title -
economica
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.532
H-Index - 65
eISSN - 1468-0335
pISSN - 0013-0427
DOI - 10.1111/1468-0335.00258
Subject(s) - superstar , duopoly , bidding , downstream (manufacturing) , competition (biology) , microeconomics , upstream (networking) , outcome (game theory) , economics , industrial organization , curse , business , cournot competition , advertising , operations management , ecology , computer network , sociology , computer science , anthropology , biology
We examine two–sided competition in a duopoly market for differentiated products. Downstream, the two firms compete in prices. Upstream, they compete in bidding to hire talent input and there is one unique superstar. The outcome depends on the downstream effect of only one firm employing the superstar. When this intensifies downstream competition, both firms are worse off than they would be if no superstar talent were available. When the hiring of the superstar softens downstream competition, both firms benefit, but a ‘winner’s curse’ emerges in which the firm winning the superstar talent earns less profit than its rival.