Optimal Law Enforcement and Imperfect Information when Wealth Varies among Individuals | Zendy

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Optimal Law Enforcement and Imperfect Information when Wealth Varies among Individuals

Author(s) -

Garoupa Nuno

Publication year - 1998

Publication title -

economica

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 1.532

H-Index - 65

eISSN - 1468-0335

pISSN - 0013-0427

DOI - 10.1111/1468-0335.00142

Subject(s) - punishment (psychology) , imperfect , deterrence (psychology) , perfect information , enforcement , economics , law enforcement , deterrence theory , microeconomics , psychology , law and economics , social psychology , law , political science , linguistics , philosophy

There is a belief that imperfect information about the probability of punishment and severity of punishment weakens deterrence. We assess this belief concerning two specific implications: non‐optimal deterrence and severity of punishment. We conclude that it may well be the case that the introduction of imperfect information entails a more severe punishment when wealth varies among individuals.

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