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Optimal Law Enforcement and Imperfect Information when Wealth Varies among Individuals
Author(s) -
Garoupa Nuno
Publication year - 1998
Publication title -
economica
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.532
H-Index - 65
eISSN - 1468-0335
pISSN - 0013-0427
DOI - 10.1111/1468-0335.00142
Subject(s) - punishment (psychology) , imperfect , deterrence (psychology) , perfect information , enforcement , economics , law enforcement , deterrence theory , microeconomics , psychology , law and economics , social psychology , law , political science , linguistics , philosophy
There is a belief that imperfect information about the probability of punishment and severity of punishment weakens deterrence. We assess this belief concerning two specific implications: non‐optimal deterrence and severity of punishment. We conclude that it may well be the case that the introduction of imperfect information entails a more severe punishment when wealth varies among individuals.