Brewed for decades: Cyprus' perfect financial storm

The Cypriot banking catastrophe was a momentous point in economic history at which a tiny island suffered such acute financial distress that it shook the entire Eurozone. Here we trace how Cyprus go to that point, via a series of mishaps and misjudgements, and missed escape routes going back over four decades. Cyprus will go down in history as one of the closest there has ever been to a perfect storm of financial instability, brewed from terrible decisions by its banks, supervisors and politicians; compounded by rotten luck and bad timing. Even Cyprus’ political and financial strengths made things worse by delaying firm action and allowing losses to build. Most imaginable horrors that could happen to a banking system did happen, and that was even before the controversial and partially botched international rescue operation. It was an international crisis in many senses of the word. The crisis was hosted in Cyprus, massively escalated by events in Greece, and paid for in large part by Russian depositors. There are lessons for Greece, but the experiences also have important differences. Crucially, there was a strong constituency in Cyprus to support painful austerity and structural reforms necessary to get rid of capital controls. That does not exist in Greece. The dramatic unfolding of events on the night of 15 March 2013 also provides a lesson that was not heeded in Greece. All‐night negotiating sessions against hard‐deadlines tend to lead to highly flawed agreements, though they are also a symptom of such commitment to the euro that things might work out in spite of the flaws.