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The market for corporate control in professional football: is there an agency problem?
Author(s) -
McMaster Robert
Publication year - 1997
Publication title -
economic affairs
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.24
H-Index - 18
eISSN - 1468-0270
pISSN - 0265-0665
DOI - 10.1111/1468-0270.00038
Subject(s) - agency (philosophy) , club , football , control (management) , property rights , principal–agent problem , business , property (philosophy) , football club , accounting , public relations , law and economics , economics , corporate governance , political science , finance , management , law , microeconomics , sociology , social science , medicine , philosophy , epistemology , anatomy
This paper identifies the nature of agency problems in professional football in the UK. Conflicting elements within director‐owners’objective functions combined with highly concentrated ownership rights are sources of agency problems, manifest by the poor financial performance of many clubs. Arguably, a club's supporters influence its output implying that supporters may be considered as an input. Given this, theory suggests that efficiency may be enhanced if supporters possess more property rights in their respective clubs.