Premium
The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games
Author(s) -
Martimort David,
Stole Lars
Publication year - 2002
Publication title -
econometrica
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 16.7
H-Index - 199
eISSN - 1468-0262
pISSN - 0012-9682
DOI - 10.1111/1468-0262.t01-1-00345
Subject(s) - revelation , delegation , agency (philosophy) , citation , library science , sociology , political science , operations research , computer science , law , philosophy , engineering , social science , theology
In the context of common agency adverse-selection games we illustrate that the revelation principle cannot be applied to study equilibria of the multi-principal games. We then demonstrate that an extension of the taxation principle - what we term the delegation principle - can be used to characterize the set of all common agency equilibria.