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On the Value of Competition in Procurement Auctions
Author(s) -
Compte Olivier,
Jehiel Philippe
Publication year - 2002
Publication title -
econometrica
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 16.7
H-Index - 199
eISSN - 1468-0262
pISSN - 0012-9682
DOI - 10.1111/1468-0262.00278
Subject(s) - common value auction , competition (biology) , citation , value (mathematics) , procurement , library science , information retrieval , combinatorics , computer science , economics , business , microeconomics , marketing , mathematics , ecology , machine learning , biology
This short paper shows that in an affiliated value setting one more bidder at the auction stage need not induce a higher expected welfare in either ascending price or second price auctions. We highlight the roles of asymmetries between bidders and of the multidimensional character of the private information in deriving this result.