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Strategic Candidacy and Voting Procedures
Author(s) -
Dutta Bhaskar,
Jackson Matthew O.,
Le Breton Michel
Publication year - 2001
Publication title -
econometrica
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 16.7
H-Index - 199
eISSN - 1468-0262
pISSN - 0012-9682
DOI - 10.1111/1468-0262.00228
Subject(s) - unanimity , candidacy , voting , outcome (game theory) , incentive , cardinal voting systems , bullet voting , approval voting , anti plurality voting , affect (linguistics) , political science , microeconomics , business , economics , actuarial science , psychology , law , politics , communication
We study the incentives of candidates to strategically affect the outcome of a voting procedure. We show that the outcomes of every nondictatorial voting procedure that satisfies unanimity will be affected by the incentives of noncontending candidates (i.e., who cannot win the election) to influence the outcome by entering or exiting the election.