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Efficiency of Large Private Value Auctions
Author(s) -
Swinkels Jeroen M.
Publication year - 2001
Publication title -
econometrica
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 16.7
H-Index - 199
eISSN - 1468-0262
pISSN - 0012-9682
DOI - 10.1111/1468-0262.00178
Subject(s) - common value auction , bidding , microeconomics , revenue , economics , value (mathematics) , aggregate (composite) , mathematical economics , econometrics , mathematics , finance , statistics , materials science , composite material
We consider discriminatory and uniform price auctions for multiple identical units of a good. Players have private values, possibly asymmetrically distributed and for multiple units. Our setting allows for aggregate uncertainty about demand and supply. In this setting, equlibria generally will be inefficient. Despite this, we show that such auctions become arbitrarily close to efficient if they are “large,” and use this to derive an asymptotic characterization of revenue and bidding behavior.