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A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium
Author(s) -
Hart Sergiu,
MasColell Andreu
Publication year - 2000
Publication title -
econometrica
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 16.7
H-Index - 199
eISSN - 1468-0262
pISSN - 0012-9682
DOI - 10.1111/1468-0262.00153
Subject(s) - simple (philosophy) , economics , mathematical economics , mathematics , econometrics , statistical physics , physics , philosophy , epistemology
We propose a new and simple adaptive procedure for playing a game: ‘regret‐matching.’ In this procedure, players may depart from their current play with probabilities that are proportional to measures of regret for not having used other strategies in the past. It is shown that our adaptive procedure guarantees that, with probability one, the empirical distributions of play converge to the set of correlated equilibria of the game.