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Strategy‐proofness and Essentially Single‐valued Cores
Author(s) -
Sönmez Tayfun
Publication year - 1999
Publication title -
econometrica
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 16.7
H-Index - 199
eISSN - 1468-0262
pISSN - 0012-9682
DOI - 10.1111/1468-0262.00044
Subject(s) - citation , computer science , mathematical economics , operations research , information retrieval , library science , economics , mathematics
IN THIS PAPER WE SEARCH for solutions to various classes of allocation problems. We hand results pertaining to housing markets are much more encouraging. Roth 1982b shows that in the context of housing markets the core correspondence, which is shown to Ž. Ž . be single-valued by Roth and Postlewaite 1977 , is strategy-proof. Moreover Ma 1994 shows that it is the only solution that is Pareto efficient, individually rational, and strategy-proof.