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The Model Theoretic Argument, Indirect Realism, and the Causal Theory of Reference Objection
Author(s) -
Reynolds Steven L.
Publication year - 2003
Publication title -
pacific philosophical quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.914
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1468-0114
pISSN - 0279-0750
DOI - 10.1111/1468-0114.00167
Subject(s) - argument (complex analysis) , epistemology , realism , metaphysics , causal theory of reference , philosophy , direct and indirect realism , perception , critical realism (philosophy of perception) , philosophical realism , argument map , philosophy of science , biochemistry , chemistry , argumentation theory
Hilary Putnam has reformulated his model‐theoretic argument as an argument against indirect realism in the philosophy of perception. This new argument is reviewed and defended. Putnam's new focus on philosophical theories of perception (instead of metaphysical realism) makes better sense of his previous responses to the objection from the causal theory of reference. It is argued that the model‐theoretic argument can also be construed as an argument that holders of a causal theory of reference should adopt direct realism in the philosophy of perception.