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Novel Colours and the Content of Experience
Author(s) -
Macpherson Fiona
Publication year - 2003
Publication title -
pacific philosophical quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.914
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1468-0114
pISSN - 0279-0750
DOI - 10.1111/1468-0114.00162
Subject(s) - counterexample , character (mathematics) , naturalism , representation (politics) , perception , content (measure theory) , epistemology , psychology , aesthetics , cognitive science , philosophy , cognitive psychology , mathematics , combinatorics , geometry , mathematical analysis , politics , political science , law
Abstract: I propose a counterexample to naturalistic representational theories of phenomenal character. The counterexample is generated by experiences of novel colours reported by Crane and Piantanida. I consider various replies that a representationalist might make, including whether novel colours could be possible colours of objects and whether one can account for novel colours as one would account for binary colours or colour mixtures. I argue that none of these strategies is successful and therefore that one cannot fully explain the nature of the phenomenal character of perceptual experiences using a naturalistic conception of representation.