Premium
Alternative Frankfurt‐Style Counterexamples to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities
Author(s) -
Goetz Stewart
Publication year - 2002
Publication title -
pacific philosophical quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.914
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1468-0114
pISSN - 0279-0750
DOI - 10.1111/1468-0114.00139
Subject(s) - counterexample , construct (python library) , epistemology , style (visual arts) , power (physics) , philosophy , freedom of choice , mathematical economics , law and economics , sociology , law , mathematics , computer science , political science , physics , history , combinatorics , archaeology , quantum mechanics , programming language
In this paper, I assume that if we have libertarian freedom, it is located in the power to choose and its exercise. Given this assumption, I then further assume a version of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) which states that an agent is morally responsible for his choice only if he could have chosen otherwise. With these assumptions in place, I examine three recent attempts to construct Frankfurt‐style counterexamples (FSCs) to PAP. I argue that all fail to undermine the intuitive plausibility of PAP.