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A Not‐So‐Simple View of International Action
Author(s) -
Chan David K.
Publication year - 1999
Publication title -
pacific philosophical quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.914
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1468-0114
pISSN - 0279-0750
DOI - 10.1111/1468-0114.00070
Subject(s) - consistency (knowledge bases) , action (physics) , simple (philosophy) , intentionality , epistemology , point (geometry) , philosophy , computer science , mathematics , artificial intelligence , physics , geometry , quantum mechanics
The Simple View (SV) holds that for someone to intentionally A, he must intend to A. Critics of SV point to intentional actions which, due to belief‐conditions or consistency constraints, agents cannot intend. By recognizing species of intention which vary with the agent’s confidence in acting, I argue that the stringency of consistency constraints depends on the agent’s confidence. A sophisticated SV holds that the species of intending is related to the degree of intentionality of the action. Finally, I show that where agents do what they believe impossible, without intending to do so, the action is not intentional.