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Semantics and the Dual‐Aspect use of Definite Descriptions
Author(s) -
O’Rourke Michael
Publication year - 1998
Publication title -
pacific philosophical quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.914
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1468-0114
pISSN - 0279-0750
DOI - 10.1111/1468-0114.00062
Subject(s) - attributive , mistake , semantics (computer science) , dual (grammatical number) , epistemology , physicalism , computer science , truth condition , semantic theory of truth , linguistics , philosophy of language , philosophy , metaphysics , political science , law , programming language
Many philosophers of language have held that a truth‐conditional semantic account can explain the data motivating the distinction between referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions, but I believe this is a mistake. I argue that these data also motivate what I call “dual‐aspect” uses as a distinct but closely related type. After establishing that an account of the distinction must also explain dual‐aspect uses, I argue that the truth‐conditional Semantic Model of the distinction cannot. Thus, the Semantic Model cannot explain the data for which it is developed and so fails as an account of the referential/attributive distinction.