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Problems with Principle P
Author(s) -
Caplin Hugh
Publication year - 1997
Publication title -
pacific philosophical quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.914
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1468-0114
pISSN - 0279-0750
DOI - 10.1111/1468-0114.00039
Subject(s) - epistemology , connectionism , philosophy , realism , psychology , cognition , neuroscience
In Psychosemantics Fodor presents three arguments for preferring the language of thought over mere intentional realism ‐ arguments for the conclusion that intentional causes of behavior have constituent structure. The first of these, relying on the methodological ‘Principle P’, is considered in detail here and is found wanting. This principle does not prefer the language of thought to those very connectionist systems which Fodor criticizes; and it rests on dubious theoretical and empirical assumptions.