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The Tragedy of the Commons Revisited
Author(s) -
Hartwick John M.,
Yeung David W.K.
Publication year - 1997
Publication title -
pacific economic review
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.34
H-Index - 33
eISSN - 1468-0106
pISSN - 1361-374X
DOI - 10.1111/1468-0106.t01-1-00022
Subject(s) - clan , tragedy of the commons , commons , economics , consumption (sociology) , per capita , population , microeconomics , property rights , demography , law , ecology , biology , sociology , political science , social science
The Malthus–Hardin tragedy of the commons is formulated as a dynamic game between “clans”. At each date a member of a clan desires more newborns of her/his type and more current consumption, harvested from the commons. Equilibrium in the dynamic game yields a steady state level of per capita consumption and a steady population level for each clan (births equal deaths). Four outcomes are obtained, depending on the assumptions about the discount rates of members of a clan and about the mode of competition for “large populations” for each clan. Lack of property rights for agricultural land in the commons leads to equilibrium with excessive populations and low per capita consumption.