Premium
Planting Disinformation through Voluntary Export Restraints
Author(s) -
Miyagiwa Kaz,
Ohno Yuka
Publication year - 1998
Publication title -
pacific economic review
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.34
H-Index - 33
eISSN - 1468-0106
pISSN - 1361-374X
DOI - 10.1111/1468-0106.00044
Subject(s) - disinformation , negotiation , government (linguistics) , limiting , economics , international economics , international trade , business , law , political science , mechanical engineering , philosophy , linguistics , social media , engineering
Voluntary export restraints typically are determined in bilateral negotiations between an importing country and a major exporting country, and have the appearance of forcibly limiting exports from the latter while leaving minor exporters unrestrained. However, during the negotiation process the major exporter can acquire insight into the nature of the importing country government. This private information may actually motivate the major exporter to restrain exports voluntarily.