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Animal Action in the Space of Reasons
Author(s) -
Hurley Susan
Publication year - 2003
Publication title -
mind and language
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.905
H-Index - 68
eISSN - 1468-0017
pISSN - 0268-1064
DOI - 10.1111/1468-0017.00223
Subject(s) - holism , action (physics) , mistake , epistemology , context (archaeology) , rationality , cognitive science , promiscuity , psychology , space (punctuation) , cognition , computer science , philosophy , paleontology , physics , quantum mechanics , neuroscience , political science , psychoanalysis , law , biology , operating system
I defend the view that we should not overintellectualize the mind. Nonhuman animals can occupy islands of practical rationality: they can have context‐bound reasons for action even though they lack full conceptual abilities. Holism and the possibility of mistake are required for such reasons to be the agent's reasons, but these requirements can be met in the absence of inferential promiscuity. Empirical work with animals is used to illustrate the possibility that reasons for action could be bound to symbolic or social contexts, and connections are made to simulationist accounts of cognitive skills.