Premium
Computation as Involving Content: A Response to Egan
Author(s) -
Peacocke Christopher
Publication year - 1999
Publication title -
mind and language
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.905
H-Index - 68
eISSN - 1468-0017
pISSN - 0268-1064
DOI - 10.1111/1468-0017.00109
Subject(s) - generality , content (measure theory) , computer science , counterfactual conditional , computation , sort , naturalism , cognitive psychology , cognitive science , psychology , epistemology , social psychology , mathematics , algorithm , information retrieval , counterfactual thinking , mathematical analysis , philosophy , psychotherapist
Only computational explanations of a content‐involving sort can answer certain ‘how’‐questions; can support content‐involving counterfactuals; and have the generality characteristic of psychological explanations. Purely formal characteriza‐tions of computations have none of these properties, and do not determine content. These points apply not only to psychological explanation, but to Turing machines themselves. Computational explanations which involve content are not opposed to naturalism. They are also required if we are to explain the content‐involving properties of mental states.