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Semantic Theory and Indirect Speech
Author(s) -
Richard Mark
Publication year - 1998
Publication title -
mind and language
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.905
H-Index - 68
eISSN - 1468-0017
pISSN - 0268-1064
DOI - 10.1111/1468-0017.00097
Subject(s) - falsity , utterance , literal (mathematical logic) , philosophy , semantic theory of truth , indirect speech , speech act , epistemology , semantics (computer science) , linguistics , philosophy of mind , philosophy of language , psychology , metaphysics , computer science , programming language
Cappelen and Lepore argue against the principle P: A semantic theory ought to assign p to S if uttering S is saying p . An upshot of P’s falsity, they allege, is that some objections to Davidson’s programme (such as Foster’s) turn out to be without force. This essay formulates and defends a qualified version of P against Cappelen and Lepore’s objections. It distinguishes P from the more fundamental Q: A semantic theory ought to assign p to S iff literal utterance of S literally says p . Without some objection to Q—which Cappelen and Lepore do not supply—Foster’s objection to Davidson’s programme stands.