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Employer‐Sponsored Health Insurance and Mandated Benefit Laws
Author(s) -
Jensen Gail A.,
Morrisey Michael A.
Publication year - 1999
Publication title -
the milbank quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.563
H-Index - 101
eISSN - 1468-0009
pISSN - 0887-378X
DOI - 10.1111/1468-0009.00147
Subject(s) - scope (computer science) , health insurance , health benefits , business , empirical evidence , public economics , state (computer science) , economics , law , actuarial science , health care , economic growth , political science , medicine , philosophy , epistemology , computer science , programming language , traditional medicine , algorithm
Regulations for the content of private health plans, called mandated benefit laws, are widespread and growing in the United States, at both state and federal levels. Three aspects of these laws are examined: their current scope; some economic reasons for their existence; and the theory and empirical evidence for their effects in health insurance markets. A growing body of literature suggests that society is paying a high price for enhanced coverage via mandated benefits. These laws increase insurance premiums, cause declines in wages and other fringe benefits, and lead some employers and their workers to forgo health benefits altogether. The cost of mandated benefit laws falls disproportionately on workers in small firms.