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Strategic Interactions in a Growth Model with Infrastructure Capital
Author(s) -
Shibata Akihisa
Publication year - 2002
Publication title -
metroeconomica
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.256
H-Index - 29
eISSN - 1467-999X
pISSN - 0026-1386
DOI - 10.1111/1467-999x.00151
Subject(s) - commit , endogenous growth theory , economics , capital (architecture) , microeconomics , growth model , nash equilibrium , variable (mathematics) , human capital , market economy , computer science , mathematical analysis , mathematics , archaeology , database , history
A dynamic game growth model with infrastructure capital is analyzed and it is shown that the pattern of growth can be either endogenous or exogenous depending on agents’ commitment behavior. If the agents commit their future actions, there is a unique Nash equilibrium with endogenous growth. However, if they cannot commit their future actions and they condition their actions on the state variable at each time, then for any level of infrastructure capital there exist infinitely many equilibria: some of them exhibit endogenous growth and others show no growth in the long run (or even in the short run).