Premium
A Generalized Oligopoly Model
Author(s) -
Watt Richard
Publication year - 2002
Publication title -
metroeconomica
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.256
H-Index - 29
eISSN - 1467-999X
pISSN - 0026-1386
DOI - 10.1111/1467-999x.00135
Subject(s) - cournot competition , stackelberg competition , oligopoly , economics , marginal cost , microeconomics , generalization , mathematical economics , competition (biology) , bertrand competition , market share , social welfare , mathematics , mathematical analysis , ecology , finance , political science , law , biology
This paper generalizes and unifies the traditional quantity competition oligopoly models of Cournot and Stackelberg. Traditional oligopoly models predict that, under constant marginal costs, there will only be one market share (Cournot) or a single firm with a large market share and all others with the same market share (Stackelberg). Without altering the basic assumption set, in particular the assumptions of common marginal cost functions, perfect information and linear demand, the paper presents a general model that may be useful to explain many real‐life situations of oligopoly competition, where many different market shares may coexist. Finally, it is shown that certain existing social welfare results are robust to the generalization.