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Asymmetric Type Recognition with Applications to Dilemma Games
Author(s) -
Engelmann Dirk
Publication year - 2001
Publication title -
metroeconomica
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.256
H-Index - 29
eISSN - 1467-999X
pISSN - 0026-1386
DOI - 10.1111/1467-999x.00125
Subject(s) - dilemma , information asymmetry , prisoner's dilemma , type (biology) , complete information , population , mathematical economics , game theory , asymmetry , microeconomics , computer science , economics , mathematics , sociology , ecology , physics , geometry , demography , quantum mechanics , biology
I analyze a model of a special form of information asymmetry, namely that players can recognize whether the other players are of their own type or of a different type, without knowing which particular type. If more than two types are present in the population, this implies that knowledge about other players depends both on the own type and on that of the other players. The analysis of two examples, a prisoner’s dilemma and a trust game, shows that this form of information asymmetry can lead to the same results as complete information, while based on less demanding information conditions.