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Durable Goods Monopoly, Buyer Uncertainty, and Concurrent Selling and Renting
Author(s) -
Goering Gregory E.
Publication year - 2000
Publication title -
metroeconomica
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.256
H-Index - 29
eISSN - 1467-999X
pISSN - 0026-1386
DOI - 10.1111/1467-999x.00098
Subject(s) - durable good , monopolistic competition , economics , microeconomics , stylized fact , monopoly , renting , product (mathematics) , production (economics) , product market , industrial organization , business , commerce , incentive , geometry , mathematics , political science , law , macroeconomics
Stylized durable goods monopoly models typically conclude that monopolists prefer to rent their output due to commitment problems associated with sales. However, we commonly observe monopolistic firms in durable goods industries simultaneously selling and renting output. To address this apparent discrepancy a simple two‐period asymmetric information model is constructed where buyers are uncertain of the good's durability and the firm's manufacturing costs. This is a natural asymmetric information specification since the firm typically has more precise knowledge of product durability and production costs than buyers do. The analysis indicates that a monopolist may wish to concurrently sell and rent output when buyers do not have perfect knowledge. If, for example, consumers believe that product durability and manufacturing costs are higher than they truly are, the firm may wish to simultaneously sell and rent output. Thus buyers' expectations about firm costs and product durability are of critical importance in durable goods models, particularly in terms of explaining concurrent rentals and sales.