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From Ultimatum Bargaining to Dictatorship—an Experimental Study of Four Games Varying in Veto Power
Author(s) -
Güth Werner,
Huck Steffen
Publication year - 1997
Publication title -
metroeconomica
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.256
H-Index - 29
eISSN - 1467-999X
pISSN - 0026-1386
DOI - 10.1111/1467-999x.00033
Subject(s) - ultimatum game , veto , generosity , economics , stochastic game , dictator , microeconomics , dictatorship , dictator game , power (physics) , bargaining power , political science , democracy , law , politics , physics , quantum mechanics
Inspired by Bolton and Zwick (1995) we study four different games, namely the ultimatum and dictator game as well as the two games in which a veto (non‐acceptance) of the responder implies that only one of the two players does not receive the proposed payoff. In the experiment the participants had to play either as the proposer or as the responder in all four games. Only the proposer was privately informed about the actual cake size which could be either small or large. The main results were that the offers were more generous when the responder could only veto the proposer's payoff than in ultimatum bargaining which, in turn, induced more generous offers than dictatorship. The worst proposals were observed when the responder could only reject his own payoff. A similar tendency was also observed for the minimal offers required for acceptance although many acceptance strategies were non‐monotonic. Allocators with large cakes did not hide behind the small cake by offering an equal share of the small cake. A pre‐experimental questionnaire designed to trigger considerations of backward induction led to more generosity.