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Epistemic Injustice The Third Way?
Author(s) -
Marshall S.E.
Publication year - 2003
Publication title -
metaphilosophy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.475
H-Index - 35
eISSN - 1467-9973
pISSN - 0026-1068
DOI - 10.1111/1467-9973.00267
Subject(s) - openness to experience , epistemology , reflexivity , virtue , injustice , epistemic virtue , sociology , loyalty , philosophy , political science , psychology , law , social psychology , social science
In response to Miranda Fricker's advocacy of a virtue of ‘reflexive critical openness’, I emphasise the importance of other virtues, such as loyalty, in evaluating an agent's response to testimony, and I query Fricker's claim that in certain circumstances agents can lack a means to correct their faulty evaluations of another's testimony

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