A Solution to the Paradox of Analysis

This essay attempts to solve the so‐called paradox of analysis: if one is to have any questions about x , one must know x ; but if one knows x , one has no questions about x . The obvious solution is this: one can inquire into x if one knows some, but not all, of x 's parts. But this solution is erroneous. Let x ′ be those parts of x with which one is acquainted, and let S be the percipient in question. As with x , either S knows x ′, in which case he has no questions about it; or S does not know x ′, in which case he has no questions about it. My solution is this. Perception and cognition give us, not the thing‐in‐itself, but a certain analogue of the thing‐in‐itself. To inquire into x , it is necessary to know not x , but only some analogue of x ; and to learn more about x is to become acquainted with increasingly precise analogues of x .