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Connectionism and the Philosophical Foundations of Cognitive Science
Author(s) -
Horgan Terence
Publication year - 1997
Publication title -
metaphilosophy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.475
H-Index - 35
eISSN - 1467-9973
pISSN - 0026-1068
DOI - 10.1111/1467-9973.00039
Subject(s) - connectionism , cognitive science , computational theory of mind , interpretation (philosophy) , cognition , philosophy of mind , epistemology , eliminative materialism , psychology , philosophy , linguistics , metaphysics , neuroscience
This is an overview of recent philosophical discussion about connectionism and the foundations of cognitive science. Connectionist modeling in cognitive science is described. Three broad conceptions of the mind are characterized, and their comparative strengths and weaknesses are discussed: (1) the classical computation conception in cognitive science; (2) a popular foundational interpretation of connectionism that John Tienson and I call “non‐sentential computationalism”; and (3) an alternative interpretation of connectionism we call “dynamical cognition.” Also discussed are two recent philosophical attempts to enlist connectionism in defense of eliminativism about folk psychology.