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Self‐Regulation Versus Command and Control? Beyond False Dichotomies
Author(s) -
Sinclair Darren
Publication year - 1997
Publication title -
law and policy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.534
H-Index - 45
eISSN - 1467-9930
pISSN - 0265-8240
DOI - 10.1111/1467-9930.00037
Subject(s) - dichotomy , command and control , control (management) , outcome (game theory) , environmental regulation , ideal (ethics) , law and economics , public economics , political science , economics , risk analysis (engineering) , business , computer science , law , microeconomics , management , telecommunications , philosophy , epistemology
The search for regulatory alternatives to command and control has led many commentators to promote, or at least contemplate, the use of self‐regulation to improve the environmental performance of industry. However, much of the current debate has been characterized by a choice between two mutually exclusive policy options: “strict” command and control on one hand, and “pure” self‐regulation on the other. In fact, there is a much richer range of policy options, with most falling somewhere between theoretically polar extremes. This article demonstrates that there are a number of “regulatory variables” which policymakers can use to “fine‐tune” regulatory options to suit the specific circumstances of particular environmental issues. In the vast majority of circumstances, a combination of self‐regulation and command and control will provide the ideal regulatory outcome.