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The Duration of Litigation
Author(s) -
Spurr Stephen J.
Publication year - 1997
Publication title -
law and policy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.534
H-Index - 45
eISSN - 1467-9930
pISSN - 0265-8240
DOI - 10.1111/1467-9930.00030
Subject(s) - settlement (finance) , duration (music) , personal injury , schedule , intervention (counseling) , hazard , actuarial science , economics , law , business , political science , finance , psychology , management , art , chemistry , literature , organic chemistry , psychiatry , payment
This paper analyzes the duration of litigation. The analysis of court congestion by Posner (1972) and Priest (1989) suggests that the effects of delay reduction programs may be only transitory, because initial improvements may be swamped by an offsetting increase in demand for litigation. However, we find some evidence that time to settlement was reduced in a Michigan court by a program that provided for early intervention in each case by a judge who imposed a time schedule on major events of the litigation. Using two new data sets on personal injury claims, we find that the time to settlement increases with the amount at stake but is sharply reduced when the case is referred to a specialist in personal injury litigation. Estimates of a duration model indicate that the likelihood of settlement is increased by the completion of discovery and especially by the settlement conference. We find that the hazard of settlement increases as the case gets closer to trial. This finding is in accord with the “deadline effect” derived from certain bargaining models.