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Delegation and Wage Determination in Trade Unions
Author(s) -
Goerke Laszlo,
Hefeker Carsten
Publication year - 2000
Publication title -
labour
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.403
H-Index - 34
eISSN - 1467-9914
pISSN - 1121-7081
DOI - 10.1111/1467-9914.00139
Subject(s) - delegation , delegate , wage , wage bargaining , bargaining power , economics , labour economics , business , trade union , efficiency wage , microeconomics , computer science , management , programming language
Delegation of wage determination is modelled as the transferral of decision‐making rights to better‐informed agents. The rank and file of trade unions has less information and can, therefore, benefit from delegation. However, delegation might be disadvantageous for union members, since delegates pursue their own objectives. Also, delegates might incur a utility reduction, since becoming a delegate implies forfeiting a better‐paid outside option. We investigate under what conditions delegation of wage bargaining power is beneficial for union members and their potential leaders. The wage and employment effects of delegation are derived.