Premium
A Note on the Poll Tax
Author(s) -
Clausing Thorsten
Publication year - 2003
Publication title -
journal of public economic theory
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.809
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1467-9779
pISSN - 1097-3923
DOI - 10.1111/1467-9779.00152
Subject(s) - economics , yield (engineering) , outcome (game theory) , consumption tax , consumption (sociology) , microeconomics , indirect tax , monetary economics , econometrics , public economics , tax reform , social science , materials science , sociology , metallurgy
A poll tax is usually seen as the standard example of a lump sum tax and therefore as allocationally efficient. In this paper, it is shown that in a dynamic setting with endogenous fertility, a poll tax may yield a Pareto‐inferior outcome as compared to a percentage consumption tax.