Premium
Factor Ownership and Governmental Strategic Interaction
Author(s) -
Lee Kangoh
Publication year - 2003
Publication title -
journal of public economic theory
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.809
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1467-9779
pISSN - 1097-3923
DOI - 10.1111/1467-9779.00136
Subject(s) - jurisdiction , externality , economics , competition (biology) , tax competition , fiscal policy , capital (architecture) , tax policy , monetary economics , government (linguistics) , public economics , microeconomics , tax reform , indirect tax , history , ecology , linguistics , philosophy , archaeology , political science , law , biology
A fiscal policy of a jurisdiction alters the allocation of mobile factors among jurisdictions, affecting other jurisdictions and creating an externality. Since each jurisdiction does not take into account the externality, the equilibrium fiscal policy on mobile factors is inefficient. However, individuals of a jurisdiction may own immobile factors located in other jurisdictions. The government for the jurisdiction then considers the effects of its policy on the returns to the immobile factor located in other jurisdictions. The cross–ownership of immobile factors thus affects the efficiency of fiscal policies. The present paper considers capital tax competition as an example to illustrate the effects of the ownership structure of immobile factors on the equilibrium fiscal policy, and extends the analysis to other types of fiscal competition.